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ABSTRACT:
This paper investigates the intradaily operational efficiency of the U. S.
foreign exchange market by conducting computer simulation experiments with
market structure (the numbers of market—makers, brokers and customers). The
results indicate significant operational inefficiencies which can be explained
by temporary inventory imbalances inherent in a decentralized market. The
results also suggest that much of this inefficiency could be alleviated
through a centralization of price information.
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JEL ClassIfication:
C88, C99, F33, G14, L19“It is by no means clear what object there could
be in exchanging one bone for another.”
— Adam Smith (1937), p. 13.
This paper addresses the short—term performance of the interbank foreign
exchange market as a problem in industrial engineering. This study is
motivated by the general question of the origin of microstructures. Why, for
example, do foreign exchange futures contracts trade in an open—outcry pit
system on organized exchanges, while foreign exchange forward contracts trade
in the decentralized and unregulated interbank dealer market? While it seems
unlikely, prima facie, that both microstructures are identically efficient in
all respects, there may be differences between futures and forward contracts
that make open—outcry pit trading optimal for the former and a decentralized
dealer market best for the latter. On the other hand, there may be other
factors, such as economies of scale or large fixed costs of transition, that
impede institutional change even when the status quo is not globally optimal.
Because of this possibility for obstacles to institutional change, it is not
obvious that a given microstructure will always attain the theoretical optimum
for a specific measure of efficiency.
In general, when a class of inefficiencies can be eliminated by
individuals acting unilaterally in their own self—interest, we should expect
such inefficiencies to be negligible; for example, arbitrage opportunities
should be rare. On the other hand, when relative efficiency gains require the
orchestration of multilateral action in the common interest, the implications
are not so immediate; for example, the “long overdue reforms” of the London
Stock Exchange’s Big Bang were preceded by years of debate over the sometimes
conflicting interests of investors, jobbers, brokers and regulators
(Euromoney, 1986, p. 3). In the context of the U. S. foreign exchange market
we address these microstructural issues indirectly, by examining market
structure: the absolute and relative proportions of market—makers, brokers
and customers constituting the market. Ultimately, we wish to learn whether
1.the market performs its immediate functions —— establishing a market—clearing
price and matching buyers of currency with sellers —— in a cost—minimizing
fashion.
A thorough understanding of the microstructure of the foreign exchange
market is of interest at two levels. At a theoretical level, the combination
of a fully decentralized interbank direct market with the quasi—centralized
interbank brokered market composes a particular microstructure of considerable
importance. It is found in various forms in the secondary market for U. S.
government securities, in the federal funds market, as well as in the foreign
exchange market. Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1983) examine the equilibrium
number of dealers and dealer behavior in a fairly general setting. Garbade
(1978) and Garbade and Silber (1976) consider the Treasuries market.
Bossaerts and Hillion (1991) provide a valuable application of theoretical
microstructural analysis to the foreign exchange market. Flood (1991) offers
an overview of microstructural theories in the context of the foreign exchange
market.
At a practical level, a thorough microstructural understanding can offer
insights into the operational efficiency of the foreign exchang~market.1
Daily trading volume in the U. S. market alone was $128.9 billion in April
1989. Annualizing, this rounds out at $32.4 trillion per year, or roughly
twice world GDP.2 More significantly, 95 percent of spot volume involved the
shifting of funds among commercial bank market—makers, while only 5 percent
was devoted to customer transactions.3 The literature has produced at least
two explanations for this concentration of trading in the interbank market.
Frankel and Froot (1990), for example, suggest that commercial banks engage
actively in exchange rate speculation.4 Burnham (1991) concludes instead
that this topheavy distribution of trading volume largely results from
decentralization of exchange. The simulations here support the latter view.
Numerous recent articles provide empirical evidence on the intradaily
behavior of exchange rates. The basic issues that emerge revolve around the
statistical distribution of prices: the unconditional distribution of returns
has excess kurtosis relative to the normal, volatility is clustered in time,
and returns appear to exhibit negative serial correlation. Wasserfallen and
2Zimmerman (1985), using Swiss franc (CHF) data from nine days in 1978—80 in
the Swiss market, analyze returns over intervals ranging from one to ten
minutes, and find evidence of various non—normalities, including skewness and
excess kurtosis. They suggest that time—varying parameters may be to blame.
Wasserfallen (1989), with CHF returns over five-minute intervals for 231 days
in 1983 in the Swiss market, finds evidence of skewness and excess kurtosis,
but little evidence of negative serial correlation; he also implicates time—
varying parameters. He observes that the spread (in this case for Union Bank
of Switzerland) varies positively, although infrequently, with price
volatility.
Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) address one aspect of the time—varying
parameters issue —— volatility clustering -— directly. Using round—the—clock
hourly data for four currencies (GBP, DEM, CHF, and JPY), they find that a
seasonal GARCH specification with dummies for hours of the day and for days
following vacations fits the data well. Periods of high volatility within the
day tend to correspond to opening of trading in the world’s major market
centers, especially London and New York. They suggest (p. 578) that the
intradaily pattern of volatility clustering may be caused by trading volume.5
Bollerslev and Domowitz (1992) confirm the presence of volatility clustering
in a sample of round—the—clock, screen—based DEM rates at five—minute
intervals over nearly three months in 1989. Goodhart and Demos (1990)
describe in detail patterns in Reuters submission rates in this data set.
Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991), analyzing a set of screen—based DEN rates
at frequencies as high as once per minute from three days in 1987 in the
London market, find statistically significant negative serial correlation in
high—frequency ask prices. They also observe that dealer spreads in their
sample are largely unaffected by market conditions.6 Bollerslev and Domowitz
similarly observe that trading activity has a negligible effect on the
conditional mean spread size; they also note cross—sectional differences in
spread—setting behavior between large and small institutions. In contrast,
Melvin and Tan (1992), using daily South African Rand rates, conclude that
spreads are indeed sensitive to market conditions; in particular, instances of
social unrest are associated with wider spreads. In the model used here,
3spreads are affected by inventory; thus, while trading activity per se does
not affect the spread, anything that disrupts inventory, such as a news event,
will also affect spreads.
In a series of papers, Ito (1987), Ito and Roley (1987, 1988), Engle,
Ito and Lin (1990), and Ito, Engle and Lin (1992) also examine the effect of
news on the behavior of exchange rates intraday. Each of these five papers
uses some subset of a series of JPY rates recorded five times daily in the New
York and Tokyo markets between 1979 and 1988. Hakkio and Pearce (1985) use a
similar data set, but consider seven bilateral exchange rates while
restricting their attention to the New York market. The evidence of Ito and
his various co—authors generally supports the “meteor showers” hypothesis, in
which volatility afflicts markets in different countries sequentially as the
earth turns, while rejecting the “heat wave” hypothesis, in which turbulence
is restricted to the same country on successive days. The simulation model
here restricts attention to intradaily trading in the New York market, and
thus does not directly address global patterns in volatility clustering.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I outlines a detailed model of
the U. S. foreign exchange market, involving heterogeneous market—makers,
brokers and customers. Appendix B provides both a brief defense of the
simulation methodology and a description of the model’s validation against
real—world data. In section II, five measures of market inefficiency are
defined. The experimental technique employed, described in section III, is a
full—factorial response surface design over four experimental variables: the
number of market—makers, the number~ofbrokers, the number of customers, and
the rate of unanticipated news arrival. The response variables are the five
inefficiency measures. Section IV presents the experimental results, which
reveal a significant and complex relationship between market inefficiency and
market composition. Much of the inefficiency present can be explained by
temporary inventory imbalances resulting from the decentralized nature of the
market.
4I. An Outline of the Model
The market consists of a set of foreign exchange traders connected by
computer and telephone network.7 The market combines two distinct modes of
exchange. The customer and interbank direct markets are decentralized,
continuous, open—bid, double—auction markets. The brokered market is a quasi—
centralized, continuous, limit—book, single—auction market. The temporal
setting for the simulations is intraday; the trading day is approximated as a
sequence of discrete time periods, subscripted t E {l,...,T}. There are three
types of participants in the model: market—makers, brokers, and customers.
Market—makers, subscripted m E {l,...,M}, represent dealers for commercial and
investment banks, trading for their own accounts and subject to in—house
position constraints. Brokers, subscripted b E {1,...,B}, collect limit
orders from the market—makers into private limit order books, in turn making a
market by acting as a liaison for those same market—makers; brokers do not
trade for their own account. Customers, subscripted c {1,...,C}, represent
companies and individuals trading to satisfy an exogenous demand for foreign
exchange (export financing, for example). The subscripts i,j {1,...,N}
denote arbitrary market participants (N a M +B+C). The market—makers,
brokers and customers together compose the basis for the set of price
information. The agents are allowed to interact in the following four ways:
(1) Market—maker calls market—maker
(2) Market—maker calls broker
(3) Broker calls market—maker
(4) Customer calls market—maker
News events occur throughout the day at randomly determined times.
There are two types of news, or fundamental information: anticipated and
unanticipated events, arriving according to Poisson processes with parameters
and 1~u’ respectively. This dichotomy captures the disruptive impact of
news on expectations and the propensity of market—makers to assume speculative
currency inventories in anticipation of future events. For anticipated events
(e. g., a congressional vote or a weekly money supply announcement), the
timing of the news arrival is known in advance, thus providing an opportunity
for speculation. Market—makers know that change impends, and they hold
idiosyncratic beliefs about the post-event state of the world. If current
5prices deviate from a market—maker’s beliefs about post—event prices, he
believes he can profit from this discrepancy, and he acts on this belief by
taking a speculative inventory po8ition. Upon the arrival of news, whether
anticipated or not, all customers and market—makers are assigned new prior
price expectations, and market—makers establish new desired inventories.
A. Market—makers
Market—makers are central to the model, because they are involved in
every transaction, and because interdealer trades (direct or brokered) compose
the overwhelming majority of activity in the market. Market—makers are
assumed to try to call out each period (it is preferable for a market—maker to
call out, because calling out provides more price information and control over
inventory than does receiving a call and making a market). Incoming calls
take precedence, however, so that if a market—maker (or broker) receives a
call, he is preempted and cannot call out in that period. The decision
regarding whom to call each period and whether the call goes through is
modeled as a random matching of agents, subject to the constraint that each
pairing must be one of the four allowable types listed above. Given a
specific pairing, the market—maker must decide on price and/or quantity. If
he receives a call from a customer or market—maker, he makes a market by
quoting bid and ask prices. If he receives a call from a broker, he decides
on the price and quantity of a limit order. If he places a call to a broker
or market—maker, he must decide whether and how much to buy or sell. All such
contacts reveal information to the market—maker.
The market—maker’s pricing decision must be consistent with the
realities of the marketplace. In particular, the presence of other well—
informed and well—capitalized market—makers implies an imperative of arbitrage
avoidance: market—makers must strive first for a price consensus (i. e.,
overlapping spreads). A quoted spread that is “of f the market” serves only to
saddle the market—maker with a large inventory that could have been had at a
better price. The importance of consensus is conveyed in the words of one
market—maker:8
6“Ninety percent of what we do is based on perception. It doesn’t
matter if that perception is right or wrong or real. It only
matters that other people in the market believe it. I may know
it’s crazy. I may think it’s wrong. But I lose my shirt by
ignoring it. .. • I can’t afford to be five steps ahead of
everybody else in the market. That’s suicide.”
Accordingly, if a market—maker believes that the current price quotes of other
market—makers do not adequately reflect fundamental information, then attempts
to profit from this belief should take the form of speculative inventory
positions, not off—market quotes.
Market—maker m maintains an appraisal function, Am~ summarizing all her
prior beliefs and information on the current status of the market; it is her
assessment of the current market consensus price. In establishing an
appraisal, she does not consider fundamentals directly, but rather only as she
expects fundamentals to alter the quotes of other traders. In addition, she
has a preferred inventory position, I~taI~(Ot), that reflects her speculative
beliefs —— based on fundamental information, e~—— about future movements in
the market consensus valuation. Thus, a market—maker’s behavior is determined
first by a desire to give a bid-ask quote that will avoid arbitrage, and,
secondly, by a desire to profit through speculation from general movements in
the exchange rate. More formally, the relations determining market—maker m’s
bid—ask quote, ~mt a (Pmt,amt), can be expressed as a function, ~ of the
appraisal and of the deviation of inventory from its preferred level, Imt~I~t:
**
~mt = gm(’~(Q°t’~mt)’1mt~m(°t)] ‘ (1)
where Q is a TxN matix of past, current and future prices, and Q~ is that
subset of Q that has been observed by market—maker m up throught time t. Two
alternative specifications (dubbed “cautious” and “incautious”) of g~() are
used, in order to check the robustness of the results.9 Each market—maker’s
appraisal is endogenous in the sense that it incorporates price information as
it is observed. The special characteristics of incautious and cautious
market—makers are described next.
(1) Incautious —— In determining her appraisal, Am~ the incautious market—
maker distills all of her information down to a single best guess about the
relative values of the two currencies. The mean of her posterior marginal
distribution is: E~(pjk”,v”,n”,w”) = k”, and her appraisal is: Am = exp(k”)
7= exp[(n’k’+nk)/(n’+n)); this is the price which, if quoted, would equalize
the subjective probabilities of buying and selling)~0 If a call comes in
from another market—maker or a customer, the quoted spread is this appraisal,
adjusted for inventory considerations. Specifically, given a desired
inventory level and a tick size, z, for the market, the spread for a market—
maker within one round lot of her desired position is one tick wide and set
such that her appraisal falls within the spread. The spread widens as the
absolute difference between actual and desired inventories increases, and bid
and ask quotes are shaded up (down) to alleviate a shortfall (excess) of
actual inventories relative to desired, as described in table 1. [TABLE 1
APPROXIMATELY HERE) ~° and a’ are determined by rounding the appraisal down,
and up respectively, to the nearest tick.11
Desired inventories depend only on fundamental information, and not on
observed price information. Following each news arrival, desired inventories
are drawn anew at random for each market—maker. Desired inventories are
subject to banks’ in-house position constraints, both daylight and overnight.
The overnight constraint is assumed to be zero for all market—makers, implying
a desired inventory of zero following the final anticipated event of the day.
The daylight position constraint, P, is the upper bound on the absolute value
of the desired inventory for all market—makers. For the incautious market—
maker, desired inventories are drawn from the uniform distribution: I~(Ot) —
U{—P,...,P}. It should be emphasized that there is no correlation between the
new prior expectations parameters and the new desired inventory. Although
speculation implies that market—makers believe their counterparts have
misestimated the ultimate impact of news on prices, a correlation between new
priors and new desired inventories would imply that market—makers believe that
this misestimation occurs in a consistent and predictable (on average) manner.
There is no reason to believe that rational expectations are violated in this
way. For the same reason, there is no serial correlation in the random draws
of desired inventory levels, which track a market—maker’s speculative beliefs
about the direction in which the new market consensus price will move.’2
(2) Cautious —— The cautious market—maker uses more information from his
8subjective price distribution in establishing an appraisal. Instead of
setting the desired—inventory spread at the one—tick minimum, the market—maker
who is at his desired inventory position sets his (minimum) spread to enclose
some proportion, 6, of his subjective distribution centered around the median.
Formally, market—maker m’s bid and ask prices at a balanced inventory level
(i. e., ImtI~t) are set around the mean of his subjective log—transformed
marginal price distribution as follows:
= max {kz: F511[ln(kz)] ~ (1—ä)/2 } , (2)
and:
= mm {kz: F511(ln(kz)] ~ (16)/2 } ~ (3)
k
where k is a positive integer, and F511() i8 the incomplete first moment of
his subjective (general Student normalized) distribution. Adjustments to this
minimum spread are then made, as described in table 1, to account for
deviations of inventory from its desired level, where a’ and ~° are now given
by equations (2) and (3). For cautious market—makers, new desired inventory
levels are generated as deviates from the “triangular” distribution:
I~(et) —
B. Brokers and Customers
Brokers operate according to a relatively simple algorithm. Because
brokers do not take positions, profiting instead only through brokerage
commissions, it is unnecessary to consider their beliefs or expectations.
Rather, brokers single—mindedly pursue the accumulation of orders for their
limit order books. New limit orders can cross against existing limit orders
on any brokerage book; if they do not cross a book, they are posted on the
book of the broker requesting the order. When this pursuit is interrupted by
an incoming call from a market—maker, the broker quotes him the inside spread
from her own book, along with the amounts available at each price. The
decision to buy, sell, or pass is then up to the market—maker. If a trade is
concluded, accounting ensues to adjust the limit order book and the market—
makers’ inventory positions, and to assess the brokerage fees. A market—maker
9treats the information in a broker’s quotation in the same way as he does a
quote from another market—maker.14
A limit order remains on a brokerage book until it is hit, until news
arrives, or until it goes stale. Upon the arrival of news, all existing limit
orders are removed from the brokerage books. Staleness is included in the
model to approximate the fact that market—makers do not leave limit orders
standing indefinitely, because of the tendency of the market consensus price
to shift. The number of brokers is separate from the number of brokerage
books. Each broker is assigned to a brokerage firm with a single book.
Adding brokers to the market increases the number of brokers canvassing the
market—makers for limit orders to be entered into a fixed number of books.
The behavior of customers is exogenous to the model in the sense that
the behavior of other agents does not affect customers’ behavior. In other
words, customers consider fundamentals only, being preoccupied with real trade
and not being concerned with short—term exchange market dynamics. Thus,
quoted exchange rates do not alter customers’ beliefs about the relative value
of two currencies.’5 Customers provide an exogenous order flow to the
market—makers by contacting market—makers and submitting market orders when
the quoted bid (ask) price is above (below) the customer’s reservation
valuation. The number of customers, C, thus affects the rate of order flow.
Customers’ reservation valuations are assigned from a random draw following
each news arrival. Each customer in the model is active in the market in
every period. This occurs without loss of generality, because customers in
the simulation model are interchangeable: their expecations are unaffected by
the prices they observe in the market.
II. Measures of Inefficiency
Market efficiency has several aspects. The measures defined here assess
the market’s ability to distribute decentralized price information, to
allocate inventories, as well as to exhibit price efficiency. The are real
costs associated with these inefficiencies. Misallocations of currency
inventories generally arise when orders fail to go to the best—price market—
10maker, or when arbitrage opportunities or predictable price patterns are
exploited. Operational opportunity costs (e. g., back-office costs) are
incurred when, ceteris paribus, the number of transactions involved in a
reallocation of currency exceeds the minimum number of transactions required.
The law of one price dictates that simultaneous price quotes should
coincide: that is, all bid—ask spreads should overlap. If they do not, the
violation of the law clearly counts as an inefficiency. This is reflected in
the first three measures, which assess the consistency of decentralized
prices. The fourth measure assesses the allocational efficiency of the
market. Finally, weak—form price efficiency implies certain statistical
relationships which are independent of the specification of a “true price”.
The most notable of these is the requirement that a series of prices from an
efficient market not be serially correlated, embodied in the fifth
inefficiency measure. All five measures, Ak (k=1,...,5), have been aggregated
over the trading day, so that intraday seasonalities do not affect their
interpretation. All the measures are normalized to allow comparisons between
markets of different sizes, all are non—negative, and all are equal to zero in
a perfectly efficient market.
(1) Arbitrage opportunities -- An “orderly market” is defined here as a
market in which all open bid quotes are strictly less than all ask prices at a
given point in time. It follows that the presence of an arbitrage opportunity
implies a disorderly market. If arbitrage opportunities exist, it implies
that markets are failing to transmit all available price information
instantaneously.16 The extent of arbitrage opportunities is measured by the
number of arbitrage opportunities available, aggregated over the trading day
and normalized by the number of market—makers:
A1 a _L EA,t a ~~(K{~jt:fl~t>~~n(a~t)} + K{a~t: a~t<max(~~t)} } (4)
where K{l3~t} is the cardinality of the set of bids in period t, and K{a~t} is
the cardinality of the set of asks.
(2) Price dispersion —— A more subtle inefficiency related to arbitrage
11opportunities is measured by price dispersion. If a market—maker does not
quote the inside (i. e., market) spread, but is nonetheless able to conclude
deals at those quotes, then there is an informational inefficiency, because
the market—maker’s couriterparties are not finding the best available quotes.
A2 measures the total volume of deals concluded away from the inside spread in
a single time period; this inefficient volume is then normalized by the total
volume for the day, to facilitate comparisons between markets of different
sizes:
A2 a —~ EE { {i~t:qmt>0~ ~ a~t<0’ amt>min(ait)}} (5)
t=1 mH ~ 11
where V is the total volume for the day:
T
vaE ~ ~q~j , (6)
t=1 mEHt
and where Ht is the set of market—makers whose quotes or limit orders were hit
in period t, and is the quantity transacted by market-maker m in period t
(positive for a purchase, negative for a sale). Note that it is only
necessary to consider market—makers, since they are the only agents providing
specific prices to the market.
(3) Adjustment interval —- A measure of dynamic efficiency related to both
the arbitrage/dispersion measures just defined, and to semi—strong—form
informational efficiency, is the amount of time it takes the market to
converge to price consensus from a disequilibrium starting point, where
disequilibrium is defined as the presence of arbitrage opportunities. In
evaluating the adjustment interval, no further news arrivals are allowed after
an initial shock to the model. This presumes that the price adjustment
process in the market is stable, so that convergence is assured. Thus, the
length of time until the elimination of the last arbitrage opportunity is
measured: -
A3 a mm {t: A,t+k=O Vke {0,1,...,T—t} }, (7)
t
where A1t is measure one at period t, defined in equation (4).
(4) Misallocation —— To measure suboptimal portfolio allocation as an
12inefficiency, one must either identify the optimum, or find some other
secondary characteristic (such as the equation of marginal rates of return
across investors) that marks allocational efficiency. The simulation model
readily provides the optimum, namely the point at which all market—makers hold
their desired inventories.’7 Suboptimality is measured as the distance
(under the absolute norm) from this optimum:
1TM
A4 a EE IImtI~tl (8)
t=1 m=1
where 1mt is market—maker m’s actual position at time t, and I is her
desired position.
(5) Serial correlation —- Predictable intertemporal price patterns generally
reveal an inefficiency by the standard rational expectations argument.’8
For present purposes, predictable patterns are at least a violation of the
fair—game properties of a weak—form efficient market. Depending on the extent
of the pattern, it may also be sufficient to overwhelm spreads and transaction
costs and provide profitable trading opportunities. First—order
autocorrelations in the quotes of market—makers and brokers are used here to
measure the extent of such patterns.19 One source of such correlations
might be price shifts by market—makers to compensate for inventory imbalances
induced by having previous quotes hit (sometimes called “inventory bounce”).
The presence of price patterns is measured by aggregating the serial
correlation of quotes made by market—makers and brokers:
1 T1
M+B ~ t~3 [(Pjt—Pjt_i) 0 (Pjt—1—Pjt—2)





and M and B are the numbers of market—makers and brokers, respectively, in the
market. A5 is simply the aggregation (over agents) of first—order
autocorrelations in changes in the mean log—transformed quotes of market—
13makers and brokers. Absolute values are taken so that positive and negative
correlations do not cancel in the aggregation. The aggregate is normalized by
the number of agents, M+B, to facilitate comparisons between markets of
different sizes. The measure is designed to ignore bid—ask bounce while
capturing inventory bounce.
III. Experimental design
At this point, an acceptable computer model of the foreign exchange
market and a set of inefficiency measures are taken as given. The next step
is to see how the market performs under circumstances that represent
deviations from a base case, defined as the status quo in the real foreign
exchange market. To approximate the status quo in the real foreign exchange
market, the computer model was subjected to a systematic validation. In
addition, the two different behavioral specifications for market—makers
(cautious and incautious) are used to gauge the robustness of the model to
such differences.
Given the validated model, a randomized full—factorial experimental
response—surface design over the four experimental variables: M, B, C, and
is used.2° In the response—surface design, the simulation model is treated
as a black box that takes a vector of variables as inputs, and generates the
five measures of inefficiency as outputs. The inputs are the four
experimental variables. The aim is to predict the values of the inefficiency
measures, given the values of the experimental variables. In practical terms,
this entails fitting five regression equations —— the response surfaces ——
with the experimental variables appearing as independent variables in the
regressions. The regression coefficients and the associated covariance matrix
contain the information of interest.
In particular, the program is assumed to be a smooth vector—valued
function of four variables. This function is not explicitly defined, but
rather is approximated by a second—order Taylor series in the experimental
variables:
14= ~0k + 1mkM~~bkB+ 1~ckC ~uk~ + 1~mmkMrM ~bbkBrBr+ ~cck~
luuknunu + lmbkMB + 1~mckMr + ~ymukMrQ~+ (11)
rr rr+ Crr+ r
~ lbukD “u 1cuk “u Ek
where A~is the value of the kth inefficiency measure, k {1,2,4,5}, from the
rth simulation run, 7k a (lOk’7mk’” ~‘~cuk) is the vector of polynomial
coefficients for the approximating function, ~ is a random disturbance for
the rth simulation run, and Mr, Br, Cr and are the values of the
experimental variables from the rth simulation run.21
To measure the adjustment interval, the rates of anticipated and
unanticipated news arrival must be set to zero, because the measure would
otherwise be almost completely determined by the timing of the last news
arrival rather than by the inherent efficiency of the market structure. Thus,
the approximating function for the adjustment interval becomes:
= Y03 + 1~3M~~b3Br÷ l’c3C ~Ymm3MrM~ 7bb3BrBr÷7cc3crc~
(12)
+ rr rr rr r
7mb3’~° 7mc3” 7bc3~ ~3
where the terms are defined analogously to those above. The absence of news
arrival times also means that this measure assesses only the market’s ability
to process pure price information, in the absence of fundamental information.
The approximating functions are estimated by generating 300 data points
for each of the inefficiency measures, simultaneously varying the experimental
variables at random over a convex region. In particular, the values of the
experimental variables are drawn from uniform distributions over the ranges
shown in table 2. [TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE] For four of the inefficiency
measures (i. e., all but A3, the adjustment interval), the same set of
simulation runs is used; the inefficiency of the market is measured four
different ways at the end of each day. For the adjustment interval, all
parameters are set at their validated levels, except for the news arrival
rates nu and ~a’ which are set to zero; and the three experimental variables,
M, B, and C, which vary uniformly over the ranges in table 2. Data are
generated for both the incautious and cautious models. OLS regressions on the
data for measures Ak, k {1,2,4,5}, produce the coefficients 7k a
in the corresponding columns of tables 3 and 4. [TABLE 3
15APPROXIMATELY HERE] [TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE] For the third measure, Tobit
regressions are required, because, in many cases, prices failed to converge to
the exact no-arbitrage condition within 1000 trading periods. The regression
coefficients for A3 presented in tables 3 and 4 are the non—normalized
coefficients of the underlying model.
The question of interest is now the impact of a change in the
experimental variables on each of the inefficiency measures. Although this
can be gauged to some extent by the magnitude and significance of individual
regression coefficients, it is more meaningful to consider directly the
partial derivatives of the inefficiency measures with respect to the
experimental variables. Thus, for example, the impact of the number of
market—makers on the number of arbitrage opportunities is reckoned as:
3E(A1) ,~ —
= 1m1 + 2Mlmmi + B7mb1 + Clmcl + nulmu, , (13)
3M
where the bars over the experimental variables indicate that these are the
particular values of those variables at which the partial derivative is
evaluated, and the hats over the coefficients indicate that these are the
fitted values from the regression. The statistical significance. of this
relationship is measured as the probability of attaining a particular value
for the partial derivative under the null hypothesis that the experimental
variables have no impact on the measures of inefficiency. Specifically, F—
statistics for these linear restrictions on the regression coefficients are
calculated from the variance—covariance matrix under the maintained assumption
of normality in the error terms. Similarly, the impact of experimental
variables in the Tobit regressions on A3 are reckoned as partial derivatives.
The relationship of interest here is the partial derivative of the expectation
of the underlying (i. e., uncensored) inefficiency measure with respect to a
change in an experimental variable.22 For example, the partial derivative
of the expected adjustment interval, E(A3), with respect to the number of
market—makers is simply:
3E(A3)
= ~~‘m3 + 2M1mm3 + B7mb3
+ C~Ymc3 . (14)
3M
The statistical significance of such deviations is calculated from the
16variance—covariance matrix as an F—statistic on the linear restriction as
before.
These partial derivatives are evaluated at two different values of the
vector of experimental variables, to ensure the robustness of the conclusions.
The two points chosen are the population mean from the experimental region
given in table 2, and the status quo levels of the experimental variables,
given by their validated levels. The results of these tests of the direction
and significance of the impact of the experimental variables on the measures
of inefficiency are presented in tables 5 and 6.
IV. Results of the experiments
A. The issues
Before considering the experimental results, it is useful to review the
issues that make them relevant. The first three experimental variables (M, B
and C) could imply normative policy implications. If there were some market
composition minimizing the inefficiency measures, and the market. is not
currently achieving that optimum, then it would be in the general interest
exogeneously to impose barriers to entry or exit, to force the market toward
the optimal composition. Such a direct approach falters here on the standard
vector optimization problem: none of the four experimental variables is
uniformly good or bad across all five inefficiency measures. Establishing an
objective function for inefficiency .minimization would require some implicit
or explicit prioritization of the different types of inefficiency. Such a
weighting is not attempted here. A more holistic analysis of the results
proves fruitful, however. It is suggested that a single microstructural fact
—— the decentralized nature of the market —— accounts for most of the
significant effects reported here. -
It is not clear a priori whether the market should be larger, smaller,
or remain at the current size. The traditional argument is for centralization
of exchange; at the extreme, it implies natural monopolies for market—makers
and brokers. The opposite stand, that interdealer competition promotes
17efficiency, is also defensible.23 Finally, a resort to naive institutional
Darwinism argues that the status quo must be best. The purpose of
experimenting with M, B and Ci sto find out which of these arguments is
correct. The sources Of disagreement are revealed on closer examination,
Increasing the number of market—makers obviates the possibility of monopoly
profits while simultaneously increasing the market’s ability to process
information, since there are more individuals with differing perspectives
attempting to evaluate the same commodity. On the other hand, the
decentralized nature of the market implies that price dispersion and arbitrage
opportunities should increase with the number of market—makers providing
quotes. Similarly, increased customer order flows may tend to stabilize the
market, by forcing exchange rates into line with some real—trade valuation, or
they may tend to roil the market, as they effect shocks to individual market-
makers’ inventories. Finally, more brokers should tend to centralize price
information and thus reduce search costs, but, because brokered limit orders
do not expire immediately, the same increase in limit orders may induce price
dynamics which deviate from the martingale model.
The rate of unanticipated news arrival, ~u’ differs from the other
experimental variables in that it is not a factor in market size or
composition. It is included to gauge the market’s ability to absorb and
process new information. Engle, Ito and Lin (1990), for example, suggest that
“traders with heterogeneous priors and private information may take some hours
of trading, after a shock, to have expectational differences resolved” (pp.
525—6). Although it is unclear that a resolution of expectational
differences, in the sense of a homogeneous posterior distribution over future
prices, is in any way desirable, a homogeneous subjective distribution over
current prices is a practical prerequisite for market efficiency. That is,
arbitrage opportunities are inconsistent with efficiency.
Tables 5 and 6 reveal some interesting general characteristics of the
market. [TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE] [TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Considering only the statistically significant partial derivatives, none of
the experimental variables is uniformly good or bad across all five
inefficiency measures.24 A comforting result is the consistency of signs
18and magnitudes across the tables. With a few exceptions, partial derivatives
which are significantly positive (or negative) for one behavioral
specification and evaluation point exhibit the same property under the other
three arrangements; in no case is a partial derivative significantly positive
in one table and significantly negative in another. Thus, the inefficiency
results are robust across behavioral specifications. It also becomes
convenient to summarize the signs on the partial derivatives, as in table 7.
[TABLE 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE] The impacts of the experimental factors on the
adjustment interval, A3, are generally less significant than the other
results, a fact that is at least partly explained by the nature of the
censored sampling process: ceteris paribus, a censored sample must contain
less information than an uncensored sample.25
B. The impact of market—makers
The impact of the number of market—makers is mixed. Increasing the
number of market—makers increases the number of arbitrage opportunities. This
is not attributable directly to the relative proliferation of quotes
associated with an increase in the number of market—makers, because A1 has
been normalized by the number of market—makers. Instead, this measure is
assessing a second—order effect, as additional market—makers create more price
confusion than they resolve at the margin. Interestingly, although additional
market—makers increase the per—dealer instance of arbitrage opportunities,
they also tend to achieve a price consensus more rapidly (A3), although the
statistical significance is low. At the same time, additional market—makers
tend to reduce the degree of price dispersion. Recalling the definition of
A2, this means that an increase in the number of market—makers makes it more
likely that a randomly selected transaction will take place at the market
price. In other words, as more market-makers enter the market, they drive up
volume more quickly than they increase the number of suboptimal transactions.
This can be explained in terms of greater liquidity: as the number of market—
makers increases, the less likely it is that any one of them has an inventory
discrepancy in a given period, because it is easier for them to find a market—
19making counterparty to resolve inventory imbalances. Thus, the less likely it
is that a market—maker will transact at off—market rates simply to resolve
inventory imbalances. In other words, the more nearly allocational efficiency
is achieved, the more willing are market—makers to shop for better prices.
This explanation is also consistent with the impact of market—makers on the
measure of suboptimal allocation; market—makers improve the allocation of
inventories. Thus, the negative impact of market—makers on the degree of
suboptimal allocation indicates that market—makers do indeed create liquidity.
Lastly, liquidity, along with its implicit improved allocation of inventories,
can be held responsible for the reduction in serial correlations associated
with an increase in the number of market—makers: as increasing liquidity
associated with additional market—makers smooths out the average misallocation
of inventory, “inventory bounce” in prices tends to abate.
Already these results reveal some of the intricacy of the relationship
between market structure, microstructure and inefficiency in the foreign
exchange market. In particular, the significant impacts of the number of
market—makers on inefficiency are consistent with a single causal explanation
of market activity. This fact is alluded to by Burnhaxn (1991), who notes
that, when a market—maker is hit with an undesired inventory position:
“[The market—maker) now seeks to restore its own equilibrium by
going to another marketmaker or the broker market for a two—way
price. A game of ‘hot potato’ has begun. ... It is this search
process for a counterparty who is willing to accept a new currency
position that accounts for a good deal of the volume in the
foreign exchange market” (p. 135).
Thus, the large volume of interbank trading is not primarily speculative in
nature, but rather represents the tedious task of passing undesired positions
along until they happen upon a market—maker whose inventory discrepancy they
neutralize. This same influence is seen in many of the other significant
experimental effects.
C. The impact of brokers
Brokerage is beneficial inasmuch as it reduces arbitrage opportunities
through the centralization of prices. At the same time, however, brokerage
tends to exacerbate price dispersion. These two seemingly conflicting results
20are related, however, because of the way arbitrage opportunities are counted
in A1. If a market-maker submits to a broker a bid (ask) quote above (below)
the market ask (bid), two things may happen; either this would—be arbitrage
opportunity crosses the broker’s book, or it does not. If it crosses, it
transacts immediately with an opposing limit order on the book, and it is not
counted as an arbitrage opportunity in A1 however, it may take out an of f—
market price on the other side of the book, adding to A2. If it does not
cross, it goes onto the book and remains an arbitrage opportunity in all
subsequent periods until either the market shifts, or it is removed from the
book by news, staleness, or transaction. There is a tendency for brokered
limit orders to be away from the market spread, because limit orders do not
change when the market spread moves. The level of brokerage does not have a
statistically significant effect on A3, the length of the adjustment to a
price consensus. This may be due in part to the lower power of the Tobit
results. Brokerage does tend to improve the allocation of inventories, A4,
although its impact is only mildly statistically significant. Adding brokers
increases the level of serial correlation. This can be attributed to the
presence of aging limit orders, which tend to make brokered prices mean—
reverting as older quotes are removed. In sum, there is a trade—off involved
in brokerage: it reduces arbitrage and improves the allocation of inventories
through a partial centralization of price information, but it introduces
serial correlation and price dispersion as limit orders held on the books are
left behind by shifts in the market spread.26
D. The impact of customers
Customers are largely detrimental to market efficiency (in the same way
that students prevent a university from running smoothly).27 The expected
level of arbitrage opportunities, the adjustment interval, and suboptimal
allocation are all significantly increased by an increase in the number of
customers active in the market. Even the significant improvement in price
dispersion results from an increase in the normalization factor, total market
volume, rather than any decrease in transactions occurring away from the
21market spread. To the contrary, such transactions significantly increase in
absolute terms with the number of customers. In hindsight, this is not too
surprising. Again here, there is an identifiable causal link between customer
orders and inefficiency. When customers transact, market—maker inventory
disruptions result immediately, increasing A4. A proximate effect of these
inventory disruptions is higher volume, implying lower levels of price
dispersion per unit volume, as measured by A2. Another implication is price
shading, which yields both more arbitrage opportunities, A1, and consequently
longer adjustment intervals, A3. Whereas additional market—makers tend
simultaneously to raise the number of arbitrage opportunities and lower the
adjustment interval, the same effect cannot hold for customers. Additional
market—makers actively work toward a price consensus, thus lowering A3, but
additional customers do not: there is no feedback from market activity into
customer appraisals. The “hot potato” story is thus consistent with all four
of these impacts. The expected level of serial correlation tends to decline
with increases in customer participation, but this can be attributed to an
increase in the variance in returns, rather than a decrease in serial
covariance. In other words, customers make the price series noisier without
bringing it any closer to the martingale property.
E. The impact of news arrival
The rate of unanticipated news arrival has a mixed effect on the market.
While one might expect news to have,a disruptive effect, and while this is in
fact the case for A1 and A5, news is not uniformly disruptive. Although news
significantly increases the expected number of arbitrage opportunities, there
is no matching increase in price dispersion. The mild negative impact of news
on price dispersion implies that as news arrives more frequently, total
trading volume increases more rapidly hanoff—market volume. In comparing
the degree of price dispersion to the number arbitrage opportunities, note
that, as defined here, even the minimum level of price dispersion (A2=0) is
consistent with any number of arbitrage opportunities; as long as an
arbitrageur acts on the best opportunity available, the arbitrage will not be
22counted as price dispersion. The significantly negative impact of news
arrivals on A4 is an indirect result of differences between customer and
market—maker appraisals. Given the uniform generation of desired inventories
for numerous market—makers, the average desired inventory level across market—
makers should be close to zero at all times. After a news arrival, market—
maker and customer appraisals are generated from two different log—t
distributions. On average over many news arrivals, these two distributions
are the same, but after any given news event the mean of market—maker
appraisals and the mean of customer appraisals will generally differ. Thus, a
given event will be followed by an accumulating aggregate imbalance in market—
maker inventories, as a preponderance of customers appear on one side of the
market, say selling currency, until market—makers’ spreads shift to surround
customer appraisals. More frequent news arrivals tend to combine such periods
of net selling with countermanding periods net buying, thus bringing the
accumulated aggregate inventory imbalance closer to its long—run average level
of zero. A similar dynamic is seen in the impact of news on serial
correlation. Market—maker’s prices converge toward a new consensus following
a news event, implying positive autocorrelation over this convergence
interval. The more news events there are, the greater is the proportion of
the trading day characterized by such periods of convergence.
V. Conclusions
Among the experimental results is a single factor that can be held
responsible for most of the statistically significant impacts: the sequence
of transactions, set in motion by an inventory disruption, as the undesired
position is passed along from one market—maker to another, producing temporary
misallocations of currency inventories. This “hot—potato” trading has
implications for price efficiency as well. First, there is inventory bounce
in quoted prices that accompanies the passing along of an undesired inventory
position. Second, there is a disinformation effect on prices, as individual
market—makers may mistake a “hot potato” for a general shift in supply or
demand. In both cases, the resulting price adjustments can yield arbitrage
23opportunities, price dispersion and serial correlation in price changes.
Given this, the theoretical implications are fairly clear. From this
perspective, the traditional view of market centralization as the key to
operational efficiency is correct. One important advantage of centralization
should be the ability to route orders directly to those who want them. If,
for example, two customers call the market simultaneously, one wanting to buy
yen for dollars, the other wanting dollars for yen, and both willing to
transact at a common price, an operationally efficient market should pair
these two off immediately, rather than letting two inventory positions meander
aimlessly through a forest of market—makers until they happen to coincide. At
the very least, such circuitous routing of currency positions produces an
unnecessary multiplication of trading volume. Bilateral netting agreements
and proposed multilateral payment netting schemes indicate that the implicit
inefficiency is economically significant.28
Existing microstructures in other markets suggest institutional
possibilities for centralization in this context. A radical possibility would
be centralization of the market—making function in a monopolistic dealer, in
the spirit of the stock exchange specialist. An idealized speci,alist system,
in which the dealer participates in every transaction either through the book
or for her own account, would clearly eliminate arbitrage opportunities and
price dispersion. Moreover, it would collapse a “hot—potato” sequence of
trades into a single transaction, in effect netting countermanding inventory
imbalances across market—makers. Indeed, considering only back—office costs
and the costs of financing inventory positions, economies of scale imply that
market—making should be a natural monopoly in the current microstructure. On
the other hand, previous theoretical work concludes that competition among
market—makers is desireable —— Stoll (1978), for example, demonstrates that
equilibrium market structure in a dealer market is generally not a monopoly ——
while the empirical observation of consistent growth in the number of market-
makers argues strongly against a natural monopoly for dealer services.
Moreover, the capitalization required for a monopolistic foreign exchange
market—maker to establish creditworthiness would likely be prohibitive.
A more realistic possibility is a centralization of price information
24only. This could be achieved by collecting live direct and brokered quotes on
an electronic network (similar to the NASDAQ system on the OTC stock market).
Such a system would eliminate any arbitrage opportunities and price dispersion
as defined here. Indeed, such systems have already begun to appear.29
Centralization of quotes would obviate price dispersion, arbitrage
opportunities and the adjustment interval, as measured here. Moreover, by
encouraging price priority of order execution, such a system would facilitate
the routing of currency positions to market—makers who want them, thus
reducing the number of “hot—potato” trades. The results here indicate that a
full centralization of price quotes should enhance the operational efficiency
of the market and lead to a significant ceteris paribus reduction in trading
volume. Adoption of such a fundamental microstructural change would
necessarily entail considerable coordination between market—makers, brokers
and regulators, however.
25Notes
1. At the extreme, microstructural problems have been held to destroy
markets. Miller (1986), pp. 169—70, for example, holds microstructure
responsible for the failure of the inflation (CPI) futures contract at the
Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange.
2. Foreign exchange trading volume is taken from FRB-NY (1989); the annual
figure is based on 251 trading days per year. The corresponding figure for
global foreign exchange volume is $160.64 trillion (BIS 1990b). World GDP =
$16 trillion is a rough approximation; this represents an extrapolation from
UN (1989) estimates for 1986, using the 1986 growth rates in GDP since 1986,
and assuming that per capita GDP for Hungary and Poland was representative of
Eastern Europe.
3. See Flood (1991), p. 54.
4. More specifically, they state (p. 182) that, “The tremendous’ volume of
foreign exchange trading is another piece of evidence that reinforces the idea
of heterogeneous expectations, since it takes differences among market
participants to explain why they trade.”
5. While they do not rule out such an argument, the results in the present
paper do offer an alternative explanation. In particular, the heavy trading
volume and the relatively large price volatility that follow the morning
opening of trading may both be symptoms of an underlying common cause, namely
a wave of customer orders that disrupt the market as local customers begin
their day.
6. This result may be related to the fact that their screen—based prices are
not live quotes, but rather for “information purposes” only. Electronic
trading screens (e. g., Reuters and Telerate) are not considered in the
simulation model here. While such quotes doubtless contain some information
26—— carefully constructed time—series statistics may be unbiased, for example
-- their usefulness for trading decisions is limited. Reuters displays only
one quote at a time, while Telerate has only five. More importantly, these
posted quotes are not treated as binding offers to transact by market
participants, but rather as “for information purposes”. Posted quotes must be
confirmed and can be repudiated at the whim of the posting bank, at little
cost to their ability to deal in the future (compare this to the reputational
cost to a bank that refuses to deal when called on the phone). As a result,
posted quotes can lag the market significantly. For example, it is not
uncommon to find quotes on Telerate as much as thirty minutes old, when in
fact the lifetime of quotes (i. e., the length of time that a telephone—based
bid or ask price would be considered a binding offer) should be measured in
seconds [see, e. g., Burnham (1990), p. 12].
7. Because of its detail, only an outline of the simulation model is provided
here. Details of the Bayesian learning model for market—makers are provided
in appendix A. A full specification of the model, including flowcharts and
copies of the Fortran simulation routines, are available upon request.
8. James Horhorst, as quoted by Mossberg (1988), p. 29R. Mr. Hohorst
directed foreign exchange trading in North America for Manufacturers Hanover.
9. A total of twelve different behavioral specifications were tried. Because
the conclusions were robust to all these variations, we report only two
representative specifications here. In addition, an adaptive expectations
model was tried; it exhibited extreme cobweb-type instability, and thus was
considered an unsatisfactory approximation to the real market.
10. The notation is defined in appendix A.
11. This is a heuristic approach based on Axnihud and Mendelson (1980). Their
derivation is optimal for a monopolistic market—maker facing a stationary
stream of market buy and sell orders arriving according to a Poisson process.
However, the two basic forces at work (narrowing the spread as the desired
27inventory level is approached, and shading the quote in the direction of a
desired inventory movement) are more general. See Burnham (1991), pp. 133—6,
for additional analysis of the factors affecting the spread. In private
correspondence, he suggests that market—makers widen their spreads in the time
immediately prior to an anticipated news arrival, to discourage a last—minute
shock to inventory. This aspect of trading is not incorporated in the model.
The bid price is not allowed to exceed /3°+z = a’, because this would be
inconsistent with a trader who believed the market to be at (/‘3°,a°) and who
wanted to avoid being arbitraged. Similarly, the ask price is not allowed to
fall below a°—z= /3’. Spreads larger than five ticks are not allowed,
because, at some point, the dealer is perceived to be failing in her role as a
market—maker —- a spread of (0,cx) is equivalent to quitting the market —— and
would be asked to narrow her spread.
The spread-setting algorithm in table 1 requires some clarification.
Prices in the U. S. market for DEM are quoted European style (i. e., DEM/USD).
Spreads are concentrated at ten pfennigs per hundred dollars, with five— and
twenty—pfennig spreads also frequent but less common. Intermediate values (e.
g., .0009 DEM/USD) occur very rarely, so that .0005 DEM/USD becomes, at a
first approximatation, a de facto tick size. The failure of market—makers to
exploit finer gradations of the spread remains an unanswered puzzle; Goodhart
and Figliuoli (1991), pp. 28—29, attribute it to a form of bounded rationality
dubbed the “round number syndrome”. In the model here, however, all prices
and spreads are stated in American terms (USD/DEM), because the intradaily
bid-ask spot price data used to validate the simulation model were obtained
from the Philadelphia stock exchange (PHLX), which prices its foreign currency
options American style (e. g., the quote 1.8910-20 would appear on the PHLX
tape as “5288 5285”). This conversion compresses spreads, and the empirical
distribution of spreads when prices are converted to American terms is
unimodal. The mode is two ticks (i. e:, .0002 USD/DEM; see also appendix B),
the mean is .000266 USD/DEM, and more than 95% of the observed spreads are
five ticks or less.
2812. This approach, including the lack of serial correlation in changes in
desired inventory, is consistent with Ho and Stoll (1983, pp. 1066—67). They
define dealer m’s inventory discrepancy (“net unwanted inventory”, in their
parlance, p. 1067) as ‘m — m/(R02), where m’s desired inventory is
Em/(Ro2) a I~, and where 02 and R are both exogenous constants. The one
difference between their approach and that used here is that, for Ho and
Stoll, the sum across all dealers of Em —— and thus of I~a Em/(R02) —— is
always zero by construction: Em is the deviation of m’s opinion of the true
price from the average such opinions. In the simulations here, on the other
hand, the sum across market—makers of the I~is not identically zero, but
rather zero in expectation. Note that, in both specifications, desired
inventory is unaffected by price information: Em changes only with a change
in fundamentals.
13. Given two uniform U(0,1) random variables, u1 and u2, a triangular
integer random variable, 4~
— ~{—P,...,P}, is generated as: I~t=
t[u1(P+lflI + j[u2(P+1)]t — P , where j[•)~ is the greatest integer function and P
is some positive integer. For example, subtracting 7 from a roll of two
standard six-sided dice would yield a i~{-5,...,5}deviate.
14. This is a simplification. Owing to the difference in the way brokers’
quotes and market—makers’ quotes arise, it may be reasonable for market—makers
to interpret their information differently. Precisely modelling such a
difference in interpretation would be exceedingly complex, however.
15. Burnham (1991), pp. 136—7, confirms that customers who regularly engage
in arbitrage or short-term position-taking will be required by their
correspondent banks to reciprocate by making a market themselves. Thus, by
definition, customers are precluded from considering short—term dynamics.
16. Taylor (1989) finds significant and persistent violations of covered
interest parity in the London foreign exchange market. Similarly, Rhee and
Chang (1992) find rare instances of covered interest parity violations, and
more significant opportunities for “one—way arbitrage”.
2917. This point is always feasible in the model, because desired inventories
are bounded by the position constraints, while customers provide an
essentially unbounded pool of currency on both sides of the market. This is
noteworthy, because it contradicts the familiar axiom of nonsatiation, and
thus allows a measure of allocational inefficiency that differs from the
standard notion of Pareto—efficiency.
18. There are some limits to the application of this argument. Roll (1984),
for example, shows that the existence of a double—auction protocol is
sufficient to induce negative serial correlation in changes in transaction
prices (sometimes called “bid—ask bounce”) in a stable efficient market. Fama
(1970), on the other hand, argues that correlation patterns in security prices
are usually small enough to be swamped by the spread and transaction costs, so
that profitable trading algorithms are still not possible, even if pure price
efficiency is not achieved. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1978) also
cite this argument, and they provide several other reasons why “serial
correlation patterns in transaction returns provide only limited evidence
regarding market efficiency” (pp. 725—6). Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991) and
Wasserfallen (1989) find evidence of significant negative serial correlation
in exchange rates.
19. This clearly does not cover all possible predictable patterns. See Fama
(1970), p. 392, note 10, for a simple counterexample. The market efficiency
coefficient of Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) uses a weighted average of
correlation coefficients at several lags. Their construction requires an
assumption of Brownian motion, however, which allows the aggregation of lagged
autocorrelations; see Schwartz (1988), pp. 361—2.
20. For a discussion of experimental designs in computer simulations, see
Naylor, Burdick and Sasser (1967). For a description of response—surface
designs see Khuri and Cornell (1987).
21. The choice of a second—order Taylor series to approximate the true
response surface is not entirely arbitrary. Implicit in its use are the
30presumptions that true response functions are smooth, and that the effect of
lower order terms dominates that of higher order ones. Both assumptions are
reasonable implications of what Simon (1963) calls the “principle of
continuity of approximation” (pp. 230—1). The Taylor series is truncated at
the second—order terms to mitigate multicollinearity problems among the
numerous terms in same experimental variables.
22. The partial derivatives calculated from the Tobit regressions of the
third inefficiency measure are slightly tricky, because a number of such
partial derivatives can be calculated from the regression results. For
example, one can calculate the partial derivative for the underlying model, or
the partial derivative conditional on the dependent variable being at a non-
limiting value; see Maddala (1983), p. 160.
23. For example, Taylor (1989), p. 388, argues: “The second finding is quite
intuitive and uncontentious. One would expect the efficiency of the
international foreign exchange and capital markets to have increased over time
with increases in the number market participants ...“ He also attributes part
of the improvement in efficiency to advances in information technology. Stoll
(1978) addresses directly the relative advantages of monopolistic and
competitive dealer microstructures. For statements of the traditional view,
see Stigler (1964), p. 129, and Garbade (1978), p. 497.
24. In interpreting the results, keep in mind that inefficiency is being
measured: a negative partial derivative means an increase in the experimental
variable tends to improve market performance. This difference in signs on
partial derivatives for the same experimental variable is consistent with an
equilibrium market structure, which should balance trade—off s between
different types of inefficiency.
25. For the incautious model, 178 of the 300 observations (59 percent) are at
the limiting value of 1000; for the cautious model the figure is 182 (61
percent). Normalized coefficients, as described by Maddala (1983), pp. 156—8,
can be obtained by dividing the non—normalized coefficients (and their
31standard errors) by the standard error of the regression estimate, which is
473.6 for the incautious case, and 645.5 for the cautious case.
26. Brooks (1985), p.25, describes submitting a limit order as “sticking out
the chin so as to be acquainted with the moment that the fight starts.”
27. In interpreting the numbers in tables 5 and 6, keep in mind that the
number of customers, C, is the number of customers active in the market in
every period, not the total number of customer orders per day.
28. See BIS (1989, 1990a) and Duncan (1991). Netting procedures lower
processing and accounting costs, and they can reduce counterparty exposure
risks. Among current proposals, FXNET is a communications network that allows
bilateral netting of payment orders; ECHO and NACHO are clearing house
organizations that provide for multilateral netting of payments and
counterparty substitution of the clearing house into all trades.
29. Existing and proposed services are either for informational purposes only
(e. g., Quotron’s FXQuote and Telerate pages 263-4), or they per.form a
brokerage function, that is, they accept only limit orders, rather than
market—makers’ spreads (e. g., Reuters’s Dealing 2000). The efficiency of
prices provided for informational purposes only is not so relevant, because
there is no penalty for posting an off-market price. It is noteworthy that
Reuters’s Phase II was postponed precisely because it would provide live
quotes —— participants could not agree on liability in case of a computer
failure.
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35TABLE 1 Market—maker quote function
~mt = ~
Inventory discrepancy Quote











~ + ~ (/3~t—5z,a~t—z)
Note: For the incautious model, the base
prices, J3° and a’, are set by rounding
the appraisal down and up, respectively,
to the nearest tick. For the cautious
model, 13° and a°are set according to
equations (2) and (3).
36TABLE 2 Convex Design Region for the
Experimental Variables
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38TABLE 4 Regressions: Cautious Model

















































































































R2 (adj.) 0.928 0.779









(standard errors in parentheses)
39TABLE 5 Impact of the experimental variables on the
inefficiency measures, stated as partial
derivatives and elasticities.
Behavioral spec.: incautious
Inefficiency Impact Impact Impact
Measure of M of B of C
Impact
of
Evaluated at: population means
ÔE(A,)/8. 1.30 —2.67 3.42





3E(A~)/8’ —0.000734 0.000461 —0.000895





ÔE(A1)/3. —0.574 0.791 37.4





8E(A4)/8. —1.36 —1.59 24.9





3E(Aç)/3 —0.000209 0.000579 —0.000968





Evaluated at: status quo
8E(A1)/3. 1.69 —3.10 5.49




aE(A,)/3. —0.00157 0.000833 —0.00223





3E(A1)/3. —0.506 0.878 14.5





8E(A4)/3. —0.472 —1.39 48.1





3E(A5)/3 —0.000275 0.000763 —0.00307





F—statistics appear in parentheses
* —— significantly different from zero at .001
I —— significantly different from zero at .100
level
level
40TABLE 6 Impact of the experimental variables on the
inefficiency measures, stated as partial
derivatives and elasticities.
Behavioral spec.: cautious
Inefficiency Impact Impact Impact
Measure of M of B of C
Impact
of
Evaluated at: population means
3E(A1)/8• 1.26 —1.89 2.98





3E(A~,)/3. —0.000534 0.000175 —0.000524





3E(A~)/3. —0.186 —0.0533 20.1





3E(A4)/3~ —2.40 —1.20 33.4




3E(Aç)/3 —0.000331 0.000716 0.00103




Evaluated at: status quo
3E(A1)/3• 1.83 —2.31 6.66





3E(A2)/0. —0.00120 0.000237 —0.00192




3E(A1)/3. 0.830 —1.18 39.2




3E(A4)/3 —1.88 —1.93 63.4





3E(Aç)/30 0.000422 0.00120 —0.00108





F—statistics appear in parentheses
* —— significantly different from zero at .001
t —— significantly different from zero at .100
level
level
41TABLE 7 Signs on the Partial Derivatives of the





A1 arbitrage opportunities + — ++
A2 price dispersion - + — (—)
A3 adjustment interval (—) 0 + n.a.
A4 suboptimal allocation (—) (—) + -
A5 serial correlation — + (—) +
Note: The zero entry indicates the impact on the
inefficiency measure is not significantly different
from zero anywhere in table 5 or 6. The five signs
in parentheses indicate that the impact is not
statistically significant in all cases.
42TABLE B1 Output Vectors Corresponding to the Validated Levels



































43APPENDIX A: A Bayesian Learning Model for Market—makers
To endogenize quoted prices in the model, market—makers must take the
quoted rates of others into account, as they are observed. The particular
technique employed is a Bayesian learning model. Market—makers believe that
current quotes can be represented as draws from a lognormal distribution with
random parameters p and h.1 Each market—maker attempts to learn through
sampling (i. e., observing the quotes of others) what the actual parameters p
and h are. The analysis is simplified by performing a logarithmic
transformation on observed prices, so that learning is seen to take place in
the transformed space, where a normal distribution can be used, the Bayesian
properties of which are well known. Exploiting this, the uncertain parameters
p and h of this normal process are modeled as draws from a joint (subjective)
normal—gamma distribution, which is natural—conjugate for an independent
normal process with both mean and variance unknown. Thus, each market—maker’s
joint posterior density is also normal—gamma. More importantly, the marginal
posterior distribution of pi sa generalized t—distribution.2 This latter is
the distribution of interest, because the market—maker wants to produce the
best estimate of the median of the (untransformed) price distribution —— the
price which, when quoted, equalizes the subjective probability of being hit on
1 This follows Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) in defining the normal
density in terms of its precision, hal/a2, rather than its variance, ~2.
For a related learning model, see Conro~yand Winkler (1981).
2 There is some empirical support for this formulation. For example,
Praetz (1972) finds that a scaled log t outperforms, among others, stable
Paretian distributions in fitting stock price data. For daily changes in
foreign exchange rates, Boothe and Glassman (1987) also reject the lognormal
in favor of either a t—distribution or a mixture of two lognormals. Both
studies, of course, are measuring the empirical properties of a time series of
prices, whereas we are interested in a theoretical model of market—makers’
beliefs about the cross-sectional distribution of prices at a point in time.
44the buy side with the probability of being hit on the sell side.3 The mean
of the marginal distribution is the market—maker’s best guess about the mean
of the “actual” log—transformed price distribution. Because of the symmetry
of the t—distribution, its mean is its midpoint, and thus corresponds to the
median of the (untransformed) subjective price distribution when the
transformation is reversed.4
More formally, the following statistics for the sample of “prices”
observed by market—maker m can be defined:





vm 1 ~1(xim - km)2
nm~li=l
which together form a sufficient statistic for the entire sample under the
distributional assumptions. The xim’s are market—maker m’s “price
observations” (described below). Corresponding prior statistics n~,w~,km~
and v~are assigned at random for each market—maker at the beginning of the
day and following each subsequent news arrival.5 Following the subsequent
observation of prices in the market, the sample information is combined with
the prior statistics to form posterior statistics:
n~= n~+
This strategy applies to a market-maker with a balanced inventory.
Cf. Conroy & Winkler’s (1981) equation -1; they avoid the issue of inventory
entirely. A heuristic based on Arnihud and Mendelson (1980) is used to adjust
this formulation to account for inventory imbalances.
The correspondence between the median of the price distribution and
the mean of the distribution of log—transformed prices is a consequence of the
integrand transformation rule; see Raiffa & Schlaifer (1961), pp. 212—13.
The random assignment of behavioral parameters in computer models is
well—accepted; see Grant and Rabinowitz (1987), esp. pp. 213—215.
45= w~+ wm + 1
= (A2)
n~+ rIm
= (w~v~ + n~km
2
) + (wmvm + nmk~) -
w~+ Wm + 1
The joint posterior distribution of p and h is then a normal—gamma
distribution defined by these posterior statistics:
~r( p,h k, v~,n;, w) a f~ ‘~ k~, hn).ff.( h v~, w~) . (A3)
As a practical matter, most of these calculations can be bypassed, because the
market-maker is explicitly interested only in the posterior marginal density
of p, which is given by the general Student normalized density:
f~(~ k.~, n~/v~, w~) = rf~r(p,h k~,v~, n~,w~)dh . (A4)
.Jo
The following algorithm transforms the observed behavior of other market
agents into xim’s required by the definition of the sample statistics. A
spread, (flim,aim), quoted by broker or market—maker i and observed by m, is
converted to the arithmetic mean of the spread, after taking logarithms:
= [1~(Pim)+ ln(aim))/2 (AS)
Buy, sell or pass orders, whether market orders from a customer or responses
by another market—maker to a quoted spread, are converted to the appropriate
incomplete first moment, normalized by the appropriate probability. For
example, if market—maker m quotes an ask price am, and makes a sale to i at
this price, she presumes that the purchaser’s appraisal is above the price
asked. To incorporate this limited price information into her subjective
distribution, she imputes a valuation xjm from her observation:
km — F~11[ ln(crm) I km’ n~/v~, w~]
xim = , (A6)
1 - F~[ ln(am) I k~,n~/v~, w~]
where F~11(•) is the incomplete first moment of the marginal (general Student)
46this observation), and F~(•) is the cumulative general
This quotient is simply m’s prior conditional
given that ln(A~) > ln(am), where Ai is purchaser i’s
a sale to the market—maker who quotes a bid price /3m
F~11[ ln(j3~) I km’ ~ w~]
F~[ln(flm) k~,n~/v~, w~)
a spread of and am, becomes (suppressing the prior
notation):
F~11[ln(am) Ii — F~11( ln(/3m) 1i
(A8)
F~[ln(am) Ii — F~[ ln(/3m) I’]
Finally, The random assignment of priors proceeds in two stages. Given
the jth news event, heterogeneous expectations implies that each market—maker
will respond differently. In particular, for each market—maker, v~and w~ are
drawn from the exponential distributions ~e(~tI~vj) and ~e(~I~wj)’
respectively, and km is drawn from a normal f~(k~jp=pkj,h=l/vkj)
distribution.6 To model the fact that each news event is different from the
previous event, the four parameters, ~vj’ ~ Pkj and vk~~ are themselves
random draws. Exponential distributions, fe(1/QvjI~v)~ fe(1/~2wjI~~w) and
~e(’~’kjI~k)’ produce ~~vj’~wj and vk~~ respectively, and the normal
f~(PkjIPp,hp) distribution produces ~kj~ Values for the five parameters, ~,






and a pass, given
parameters in the
(A7)
6 To make the prior statistics consistent, the redundant statistic n~is
set to n~= w~+ 1. Furthermore, w~is augmented by adding two to the draw
from the exponential distribution, to provide sufficient prior degrees of
freedom for the market—maker to conjecture a full prior distribution.
47APPENDIX B: Validation of the simulation routine
The central advantages of the simulation methodology in this context are
threefold. First, as with any theoretical construction, the simulation model
here allows controlled experimentation. That is, one can assign (and
systematically vary) parameter values and examine the resulting properties of
the model. Of special interest is experimentation with counterf actual
scenarios (e. g., what happens when the number of market—makers is reduced
tenfold, while the number of customers simultaneously increases tenfold?).
The ability of existing data and standard empirical techniques to address
counterfactuals is limited in obvious ways. Second, the data availability
problem for this market is nontrivial. For example, even a transaction—by—
transaction data set for all market participants, if such a thing were
available, would be insufficient for the measures defined here. Measures 1,
2, 3 and 5 require all live quotes, including and especially those quotes that
did not produce transactions; measure 4 requires knowledge of every market—
maker’s actual and desired inventories. Third, the trade—off between realism
and tractability that usually constrains theoretical models is obviated (or at
least mitigated) by recourse to simulation. Tractability as a modelling
criterion can be subordinated to realism, making possible a much richer and
more realistic specification.1 A corollary proposition is that, if one is to
be confident of the simulation’s results, one must first be assured of the
1 In the words of Clarkson and Simon (1982), p. 359: “Apart from its
normative uses, simulation is a peculiarly attractive method for describing
and explaining the decision—making process at a microeconomic level. Its
first, and most obvious, advantage is the same one that has led to its wide
use in management science — it allows a degree of complexity to be handled
that would be unthinkable if inference could be drawn from the model only by
standard analytical techniques.”
48model’s realism. Validation is the implementation of this realism
requirement.2
Seven of the parameters of the simulation program correspond in a
straightforward way to observable real—world counterparts; these parameters
are assigned values equal to those of their real—world equivalents:
(1) Brokerage fees: Burnham (1990, p. 30) states, “In a spot trade in a
major currency, both sides might be charged $10 per million by the broker.”
Kubarych (1983, p. 14) identifies a higher rate: ~‘Commissionsare negotiable
and vary according to the currency, but generally amount to less than 1/100
percent of the selling price, or about $25 per $1 million”. Using the
benchmark exchange rate of .5252 USD/DEM, brokerage fees in the simulations
are set at an intermediate value of .00001 USD/DEM.
(2) Tick size: The tick size, or minimum price increment, for the market is
gotten from the PHLX tape (1989), which records bid and ask prices from
Telerate. The PHLX converts Telerate quotes from European style (i. e.,
DEM/USD) to American style (USD/DEM), because foreign currency options are
priced American style. The minimum price increment for the German mark is
.0001 USD/DEM; see also note 11.
(3) Number of market—makers: The number of market—makers is taken from FRE—
NY (1989). The survey lists 148 commercial banks and 14 non—bank institutions
as respondents (162 total). This involves overcounting, as some banks report
their branches separately, when not all branches are actively engaged as
market—makers —— some maintain a trading desk only as a correspondent service
2 The procedure used here is adapted from Banks and Carson (1984).
49for bank customers. Indeed, FRB-NY (1989), pp. 1 and 3, cites trading volume
for “127 banking institutions” and “14 nonbank financial institutions” (141
total), noting the discrepancy between this count and the list of respondents.
For the simulations, an intermediate number of 150 is chosen.
(4) Number of brokerage books: The number of brokerage books for the
simulations (14) is taken from FRB-NY (1989), which lists 14 foreign currency
brokerage firms. The number of books is distinguished from the number of
brokers servicing those books, which is determined by the input-output
validations described below.
(5) Number of trading intervals: Subdividing the trading day amounts to
selecting the average length of a trading interval, bearing in mind that
trading in the New York market occurs at a much faster pace in the morning,
when the European markets are still active, than in the afternoon. The New
York market is most active for the six hours from 8:30 AN to 2:30 PM Eastern
time, as evidenced by the trading hours on the PHLX foreign currency options
exchange [see also Bollerslev and Domowitz (1992), and Goodhart and Demos
(1990)]. For the simulations, a round figure of 1000 periods per trading day
is used; this corresponds to approximately 22 seconds per contact on average.
(6) Maximum deal size: The maximum deal size is stated in terms of round
lots in the foreign currency. Kubarych (1983, p. 12) observes that “Lately,
customary amounts have been in the $l—~million range, although for active
banks they can be higher.” For the German mark, with an exchange rate of
roughly .50 USD/DEM, this implies a maximum deal size, in terms of marks, of
roughly DEM 10 million.
50(7) Validation sampling rate: The input-output validations (described
below) require that time series of prices correspond in its construction to
the PHLX tape. The PHLX tape has, on average, 75.3 observations between 8:30
AM and 2:30 PM per day over the period 1 March 1989 to 31 May 1989.
Observations on the tape are time—stamped with the hour and minute, and only
the first observation on the tape for a given minute was used. This sampling
process is approximated via Monte Carlo simulation. Exponential sampling
intervals are generated for a range of process intensities, extra simultaneous
(after rounding to the minute) observations are deleted, and the resulting
number of observations are recorded as a function of the sampling rate. The
sampling rate which approximates 75 observations per day is .08.
The remaining parameters are continuous inputs parameters that could not
be validated as data assumptions, for lack of real—world counterparts; these
are subjected to a response surface analysis. For this, the computer program
is treated as a vector—valued function on a continuous parameter space. The
first step is to define the elements of the program’s output vector. Since
these are to be compared to reality, they are chosen to correspond to a
benchmark vector of summary statistics, the values of which are known for the
real world. The summary statistics selected are basic magnitudes representing
price levels, dynamic price behavior, and aggregate quantities traded.
All numbers are for the USD—DEM spot market. To insure a consistent set
of numbers for the validations, all of the validation techniques restrict
themselves to data for the German mark from the spring of 1989. The data for
price statistics are taken from the PHLX (1989) tape, which is filtered as
follows. Observations must be between 1 March 1989 and 31 May 1989,
inclusive, and between 8:30 AM and 2:30 PM, inclusive. Observations implying
a nonpositive spread or a spread larger than ten times the modal spread of
51.0002 USD/DEM (i. e., spreads greater than .002 USD/DEM) are assumed to be
typos and are deleted from the sample. If two or more observations on the
tape have the same date and time, only the first such observation is used.
The filtered data set consists of two time series: the bid rate and the
corresponding ask rate most recently submitted on the Telerate wire at the
specified time.
The volume statistics are taken from FRB—NY (1989). The data in the
1989 survey (in contrast to earlier surveys) are broken down in such a way
that it is possible approximately to undo the double—counting of transactions.
All non—brokered transactions between two domestic parties are assumed to be
double—counted, and are divided by two. For brokered transactions, volume
figures are taken from the brokers’ report, which is not subject to the
double—counting problem, because there is only one broker per transaction.
Brokered transactions between two foreign parties are omitted as non—domestic
trading. The seven elements of the benchmark vector, V*, are as follows:
mean price: given the sample described above, prices, ~t’ are calculated
as the exponentiated midpoint of the natural logarithms of the bid and ask
rates. That is, Pt = exp(pt), where p~is defined as in equation (10). The
benchmark mean price of .525166 USD/DEM is the arithmetic average of all such
prices in the sample.
V~,mean spread: given the sample described above, spreads are the difference
between the ask and bid rates. The benchmark mean spread of .000266 USD/DEM
is the arithmetic average of all such spreads in the sample.
modal variance in price changes: for each day in the sample described
above, the daily variance in price changes, V~, is:
521 U
a E (Pt~Pt—j)2 (B1)
u—i t=2
where v is the number of observations in the sample for that day. A histogram
is created by grouping these daily variances together into 27 bins. The
variances ranged from .00000002986 to .0000005260 (USD/DEN)2. The histogram
is bimodal, with ten observations for each of the two ranges
(.00000006,.00000008] and (.00000008,.000000lO). The benchmark modal variance
in price changes is .00000008 (USD/DEM)2.
V~, modal serial correlation: prices are calculated as above. The daily
covariance in price changes for each day on the tape, V~, is:
1 U
a ~ (Pt~Pt—1)(Pt—1~Pt—2) . (B2)
u—2 t=3
The daily serial correlation is the daily covariance divided by the daily
variance. Grouping serial correlations into 15 bins produces a histogram of
daily serial correlations. The correlations ranged from —.3413 to .2118. The
mode of the histogram is the bin (-.180,-.1403, with 14 observations. The
benchmark modal serial correlation in price changes is set at —.160.
market—maker volume: after adding together figures for commercial banks
and non—bank financial institutions (FRB—NY (1989), tables 11(a) and 11(b)],
and adjusting for double-counting, the volume of direct interbank spot USD-DEM
transactions in the U. S. market for April 1989 was USD 306,332,000,000.
There were twenty business days in Apri~l, 1989. The benchmark daily direct
domestic market-maker volume is the monthly volume divided by twenty: USD
15,316,600,000.
V~,broker volume: The volume figures were read directly from the brokers’
53summary report [FRB-NY (1989), table 11(c)], with one exception. Brokered
transactions between two banks abroad were ignored. The brokered domestic
spot USD—DEM volume for April, 1989 was USD 235,183,000,000. On a daily
basis, this is USD 11,759,150,000.
V, customer volume: volume figures for commercial banks and non—bank
financial institutions are added together [FRB—NY (1989), tables 11(a) and
11(b)]. All non—brokered transactions not concluded with another bank or non—
bank financial institution were assumed to be with customers. The domestic
spot USD—DEM customer volume for April, 1989 was USD 22,381,000,000. On a
daily basis, this is USD 1,119,050,000.
** *
These seven statistics form the benchmark vector, V (V1,...,V7), which the
computer model attempts to approximate. Corresponding statistics are
generated by the simulation program. For the statistics on price dynamics,
the simulation data are sampled at the exponential rate determined above
(0.08), and the price statistics are calculated using the procedures for V~
*
through V4.
The next step is to approximate the intractable functional form of the
computer program by a Taylor series in the input—output parameters. A first—
order approximation is used to simplify the search for the best parameter
vector. Exploring the parameter space by assigning parameter values,
~ .,p~3), at random over a compact subset of the parameter space, the
simulation generates a series of seven~dimensionaloutput vectors,
vk=(V~,.. .,V~),where and Vk are the kth input and output vectors,
respectively (k {l,...,100}). Seven ordinary least—squares regressions are
run to fit each element of the program’s output vector to the first—order
Taylor series of the input vector. That is, the following models are fitted:
54V~= ~o + i,b~1p1
+ ... + ~b~13p13 + 4 , j {l,. . .,7} (B3)
where 4 is a white—noise error term. The fitted regression equations define
the response surface. The result is seven polynomials expressing the elements
of the output vector as functions of the input parameters:
V(~i~~p)~‘j0+ ~‘j1Pi+ ... + 3jl3~l3 (B4)
where a (~‘jO’~’~’~jl3) and pa(p1~...’p13). The seven functions,
are henceforth treated as a substitute for the actual computer program.
The object is now to choose values for the elements of the parameter
vector, p, such that the substitute functions, V(~i~~p)~ most closely
approximate the real—world benchmark. It is possible to combine the seven—
dimensional benchmark vector, V*=(V~,..,,V), with the corresponding vector—
valued output from the simulation runs, V=(V(~1,p),...,V(~’7,p)), into a scalar
by calculating A(p), the square of the Euclidean distance between the two
vectors, after scaling by the benchmark levels:
7
A(p) a E (B5)
j=l
where w.,~ is a confidence weighting assigned to regression j, designed to give
more emphasis in the optimization to those regressions for which the fit is
better. The weights used here are:
a , j {l,...,7} , (B6)
— ~ f.
~ ~=i
where f~ is the F—statistic from the jth regression. Note that for equal
weighting (i. e., = 1 V j), the distance formula (B5) becomes simply the
sum of squared percentage deviations from the benchmark.
The distance is treated as a function only of the parameters, p. By
optimizing this over the parameter space, that is, by calculating
55
2
(V/wi)a argmin A(p) —— such that p* is contained in the interior of the
estimation range -— the parameter set that best approximates reality (in the
sense just defined) is achieved. Making the following four substitutions in
(B5) and rearranging:
- ~‘0j
a , j {1,. ..,7}
(V/wi)
- ~‘ij




a E 7ij11kj i,k {0,...,l3}, j {1,...,7}
j=1
the distance function reduces to:
13 13
A(p) a ~ ~ Hikpipk . (B8)
i=0 k=0
The reduced form coefficients, Hik, together compose the Hessian matrix for
the objective function. Indeed, the function is a pure quadratic form, and is
completely determined by the Hessian. Given this, and given that the
objective function is bounded from below at zero, the objective function is
positive definite everywhere, and the existence of a unique global minimum is
assured.
As a check on the validations, the equations (B4) are evaluated at the
calibrated parameter values. The results appear in table Bl. [TABLE Bi
APPROXIMATELY HERE] With the exception of the modal serial correlation in
price changes, the linear approximations (84) are able to track the benchmark
values quite well. The serial correlations, V4, followed a noisy process,
consequently produced low F-statistics in the regressions (83), and hence
received low weights (86) in the optimization.
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